2016 EU-TURKEY DEAL: DESIGNING NEW RELATIONS BETWEEN STATE AND NONSTATE ACTORS IN THE SYRIAN REFUGEE RESPONSE

Case study developed in Istanbul and Gaziantep, Turkey

Sonia Chabane

2016-2021 Sciences Po Toulouse
MA Governance of International Relations
2018-2019 Yeditepe University exchange student
Research analyst at European Horizons Toulouse
OUTLINE

I. The framework of recent EU-Turkey migration policies
II. Turkey’s official understanding of coordinated migration policies
III. Challenges faced by non-state actors operating in the Syrian humanitarian assistance in Turkey

Introduction

Concluding Thoughts

Questions
“Turkey is hosting numerous guests and they all have a lot of promises.”

The representative of the Turkish Minister of Technology, opening a panel discussion at the 2018 Bosphorus Summit in Istanbul.
3.5 million registered.
3.1 million under the temporary protection status
82,000 “preregistered” and awaiting approval for TP status.
(July 2018)

Datas extracted from the DGMM website by the date of 22.11.2018
Start of the Civil War in March 2011: 252 people crossed the Turkish border on April 29, 2011

Since September 2016, 11 million people fled from the violence:

- **IDPs**: Internally Displaced Persons: 6.6 million;
- **Neighboring countries**: Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, Iraq: 4.8 million;
- **Europe and North America**: 1 million requesting asylum in Europe, with Germany ahead.

**THE SYRIAN REFUGEE ‘CRISIS’ IN PERSPECTIVE**
Externalisation process: transfer of border management to third countries, concept at core of the European border and migration regime under 3 main dimensions (Sabine Hess):
1) techno-scientific borders;
2) internal mobility regime;
3) humanitarianization.

Reevaluation of relations in the Syrian refugee response:
- EU’s renewed approach of externalization in 2016;
- Turkey’s commitment towards Europe;
- Turkey’s understanding of a securitarian-humanitarian scheme.
How did the 2016 EU-Turkey deal and its renewed approach of EU’s externalization of borders influence the relations between state and nonstate actors operating in the Syrian refugee response?

What is Turkey’s official understanding of a coordinated border policy with the European Union post-2016?

What are the shortcomings of this approach faced by nonstate actors, principally NGOs, in the accomplishment of their humanitarian and social agenda?
qualitative approach

Primary semi-structured interviews
Representatives of Syrians NGOs;
Representative of a German semi-public agency operating in two major provinces with a dense Syrian population;
A specialist of Turkey’s civil Society.

Secondary reports and documents from NGOs, INGOs and public agencies.
An actor perspective

Public representatives: national, municipal, from individuals to agencies
Civil society organizations (CSOs): international, national, local and Syrians.

Highlights the complexity of interactions between multi-layered actors.

Participate to the thriving debate in migration studies, EU studies and sociology of political actors.
I. THE FRAMEWORK OF RECENT EU-TURKEY MIGRATION POLICIES
1. A coordinated approach of refugee “management” prior 2016

**Prior 2000s:** hardly no interest in migration politics from state actors, academia or among the public.

**Starting from 2002 (AKP):** migration control became a top priority during Turkey’s EU accession negotiations.

- **No top-down process** and Turkey’s passive object of EU externalisation policies (Sabine Hess)
- **Emerging migration border regime** since 1999 candidate recognition for full membership
1. A coordinated approach of refugee “management” prior 2016

2002-2013: A liberal approach characterized by difficulties

- Series of new laws: intensified protection of the Syrian-Turkish border, revised naturalization and work permits regulations etc.;
- Mistrust and uncertainty from Turkey over the EU membership amplified Ankara’s reluctance to withdraw the geographical limitation clause of the 1951 Convention;

2013-2015: Restablishing trust within EU-Turkey relations

2013 (Dec.) Readmission Agreement

- EU: reopening of a roadmap for Visa Liberation;
- Turkey: agreeing to take back third-country nationals illegally entering the EU after a time of transit in Turkey.

2014: “Law on Foreigners and International Protection” (LFIP)

- based on regulations of asylum and international protection;
- Delayed the Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR) + the Directorate-General of Migration Management (DGMM).
2. A renewed approach of EU’s externalization of borders as of 2016

- **2015-2016: EU’s unprecedented externalization of borders**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>November 29, 2015</th>
<th>March 2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joint Action Plan (JAP)</strong></td>
<td><strong>EU-Turkey Deal</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Context:** 1.3 million people reaching EU shores, including 378,000 asylum-seekers from Syria.

**Turkey’s financial gulf of US $5-7 billion** by providing humanitarian assistance;

**A series of emergency actions** to supplement Turkey’s efforts; « *prevent irregular migration flows to the EU* » (Part II)

**Pledged €3 billion** in emergency funding.

**Context:**
- Rise of far-right political parties;
- Closure of external-frontiers (Hungary-Serbia fence)

**1:1 resettlement scheme**, a hotspot approach;
**A system of solidarity + “burden sharing”**;
**Agreement capped at 72,000 refugees**;

**€3 billion added** (3-year plan of support)

**The principle on non-refoulement?**
2. A renewed approach of EU’s externalization of borders as of 2016

March 2018: 12,778 Syrian refugees have been resettled to EU Member States.

Source: MERCATOR-IPC report (October 2018). Syrians in Turkey
“Even if the European Union is doing some policies to stop them, I’m not sure they [refugees and asylum-seekers] will be stopped. **People find the way to get somewhere.**”
II. TURKEY’S OFFICIAL UNDERSTANDING OF A COORDINATED BORDER POLICY WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION
1. **The development of a securitarian-humanitarian apparatus**

**Uses of the securitization theory:**

**Theoretical:**

Waever & Buzan (1998): « *successful construction of an issue as an existential threat* »

Jeff Huysmans (2002) « *a security question [...] integrated in policy frameworks that emphasis policing and defense* ».

**Practical:** Especially with third countries’ migration regime, development of defense (2016 Turkish-Syria border wall)
“Within the EU, the Europeans take care about human rights but outside the borders they don’t really have to worry about that much.”

Interview with the representative of an American NGO
Istanbul, November 11, 2018
1. The development of a securitarian-humanitarian apparatus

Uses of the humanitarianism theory:

Theoretical: Didier Fassin (2007): “human collectivities”, i.e. the overall civil society, which views the rhetoric of “safeguarding the vulnerable” as a highest value of action.

Practical: Humanitarianism becomes the duty of third-party actors, operating outside of the state sphere of influence.

2017 Global Humanitarian Aid Report: Turkey is the second largest contributor to humanitarian relief and the “most generous country in the world” (AFAD).

98% of humanitarian assistance was spent on supporting Syrian refugees.
“They’re dying in the [Lebanese] camps”. Turkey is considered as the best country to get asylum, it’s the best neighborhood to live in.”
1. The development of a securitarian-humanitarian apparatus

- EU-Turkey financial-oriented approach shapes relations...

- **2001**: Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid (ECHO), EU financial instrument supporting Turkey in response to the refugee crisis.

- **2014** MADAD, an EU-regional trust fund supporting 2 million of Syrian refugees and their host communities in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and the Western Balkans.

**2016-2019**: The EU Facility for Refugees (total of €6 billion).

- Education: Ministry of Education;
- Health: Ministry of Health, Turkish Red Crescent;

→ Funds allocated by contracts to registered NGOs/INGOs.
1. The development of a securitarian-humanitarian apparatus

- ...and design a double-standard partnership

  “The Syrian crisis, even if it sounds a little populist, has never faced a lack of funding. **We always had too much funding.** In general, we were struggling with spending the money and if you struggle you have troubles.”
  Interview with the representative of a German semi-public agency, Gaziantep, November 11, 2018

  “Here our funds are coming from Western Countries [...]. **We are facing a real battle for money.**”
  Interview with the representative of a middle-sized Syrian NGO, Gaziantep, November 22, 2018
1. The development of a securitarian-humanitarian apparatus

- **Enhance political dependency through financial control:**

  “In Turkey they [state actors] don’t really push their policy, they support a lot of programs. NGOs have their own humanitarian policies. But the government, who’s spending the money, has its own agenda.”

  Interview with the representative of an American-Syrian NGO
  Istanbul, November 11, 2018
2. State and non-state actor’s commitment within Turkey’s borders

Syrian Refugees and NGOs in Turkey

Multi-layered state actors:

- **National level:** the DGMM, under the Ministry of Interior ensure the «coordination between the related agencies and organizations» (LFIP, n°6458), the Ministry of Affairs and other ones (Education, Health, Labour...)

- **Local level:** the PDMM conducts registration; municipalities.

- **AFAD** (Disaster and Emergency Management Authority) now under the Ministry of Justice.

Extensive network of nonstate actors:

- **Syrian NGOs:** advantage of speaking Arabic, often former refugees, helping with administration and asylum application.

- **Turkish NGOs:** the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), Turkish Red Crescent.

- **Foreign-based NGOs and INGOs:** UNHCR (in tandem DGMM), IOM, Caritas, Union Church.
"Two years ago, the Turkish government was pressuring donors to work with Turkish institutions. The NGOs said no, so the Turks kicked out a lot of them. The humanitarians were saying they were not leaving and somehow everybody found a way [...] Now the Turkish authorities are less pressuring NGOs; because they now really consider their role."
Short typology of Turkey’s relations with non-state actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Close and exclusive partnerships</th>
<th>Distant and uncertain partnerships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious Turkish NGOs</td>
<td>Secular little/middle-sized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-funded NGOs;</td>
<td>Syrians NGOs;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>few INGOs (the example of UNHCR)</td>
<td>U.S NGOs (Suspicion over Gülen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-level of coordination,</td>
<td>networks).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>registered.</td>
<td>Basic level of coordination,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>often unregistered.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**REMARKS**  Relations vary according to state level; NGOs preferred under a strict control; Mirror a social trend (think-tanks, medias...)
III. CHALLENGES FACED BY NON-STATE ACTORS OPERATING IN THE SYRIAN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN TURKEY
1. A blurred line: Syrian legal refugee status in Turkey

From a right to a policy

- **1951 Geneva Convention**: Right of seeking asylum and be considered as refugee.

- **1967 New York Protocol**: Turkey has not removed the geographical limitation excluding non-Europeans from recognition as refugees.

**Refugee status for... non-Europeans**

- 2011: **March**: "Misafir" (guests): undefined category in intl’ law; **Temporary Protection Status (TPS)**: access to public services;

- 2013: **LFIP Conditional refugee status** for persons under direct personal threat & **Subsidiary protection** for persons fleeing from an insecure country (non-Syrians).
“Syrians are not defined as refugees but as “guests”, they do not have the possibility to build themselves as a community, have troubles with travel permission, health, education, early marriages. They have no help no support and can use only limited resources. Imagine you live in a place where you have no chance to improve yourself [...]"
A «blurry line» as a major obstacle for social inclusion on the long-run:

1) Severe legal, political, social shortcomings; *ex: labor market.*
2) Unclear temporal limits and conditions for naturalization.
3) Tortuous applications: proof of persecution.

Exclusion of Syrians from social inclusion due to the T.P.S.
2. A renewed agenda: from humanitarian assistance to social cohesion

Over 95% of Syrian Refugees are living in Urban Centers

Datas extracted from the DGMM website by the date of 22.11.2018
2. A renewed agenda: from humanitarian assistance to social cohesion

3 steps:

1. **Arrival**: humanitarian emergency → securing lives and providing urgent needs/food/camps.

2. **Stabilization**: closing camps → 96% urban, peri-urban, rural areas (+ Istanbul)

3. **Integration**: development via **education** and labor market → preventive medicine, medical services, opening of hospitals.

➔ **Renewed coordination between actors**;

➔ **Diminution of NGOs and INGOs focused on humanitarian assistance**.
2. A renewed agenda: from humanitarian assistance to social cohesion

- **Women Now for Development (2012)**
  - Syrian women;
  - Empowerment, protection, advocacy, and research, civic participation;

- **Zenobia (2013)**
  - Young women, female teenagers, families;
  - Educate on social life and health issues in Turkey;
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Despite a historical coordination of migration policies with the EU, EU-Turkey relations reached a peak few years ago.

The 2016 EU-Turkey agreement does not conform to Turkey’s idea of equitable responsibility and their official understanding of migration management towards Syrians.

The latter is extensively intertwined with a “securitarian-humanitarian apparatus” post-2016.

An approach mostly executed in term of financial response to the crisis.

State actors used funds as a political tool to perpetrate a double-standard in term of relations with non-state actors monitoring the Syrian refugee response.

The state-given financial approach in the Syrian refugee response remains inequate with the current agenda of social inclusion.

Despite this « securitarian-humanitarian » apparatus, Turkey’s officials are both unable and unwilling to solve the current « blurred line » of the Syrian legal status, which remains the main obstacle for inclusion.
Sonia Chabane

Sciences Po Toulouse – Yeditepe University
Research analyst at European Horizons Toulouse
sonia.chabane@sciencespo-toulouse.net
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

John Hasan Yildiz, İlkim Büke Okyar (supervisor), Gökce Öztürk, Songul Ogut.
LITERATURE


- DEL CARPIO, Ximena, DEMIR SEKER, Sirma, YENER, Ahmet L. (June 2016).

- “Integrating Refugees into the Turkish Labor Market”. The World Bank, Forced Migration Review. (Opinion)


- KIRISCI, Kemal (2014). “Will the readmission agreement bring the EU and Turkey together or pull them apart?” *CEPS Commentary*, 04.02.2014


- PALM, Anja (2016). “Did 2016 Mark a New Start for the EU External Migration Policy, or Was It Business as Usual?” Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)


**Other sources: Reports, Articles.**


• Hurriyet Daily News (May 24, 2016). “Erdoğan says Turkish Parliament will block EU migrant deal if no visa-free travel”.


**UN Documents: Conventions, Resolutions, Decisions, Reports.**


European Union Documents: Reports, Notes, Conclusions, Conferences


